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Case Note
On Inuit and Judicial Protection
in a Shared Legal Order
Jan H. Jans*
I. Introduction
A recent decision of the General Court of the European
Union illustrates once again the limited options
available to NGOs wishing to contest a decision of
the European institutions before the courts.1 In 2009,
the European Union issued a regulation prohibiting the
placing on the market of seal products in the European
Union,2 except those resulting from hunts traditionally
conducted by Inuit and other indigenous communities
and contributing to their subsistence. The hunt,
including the hunting of seals, is an integral part of
the culture and identity of the members of the Inuit
society and as such is recognised by the UN Declara-
tion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.3 The case
concerned an application for annulment of the Regula-
tion, brought by a number of Inuit seal hunters living in
Canada and organisations representing their interests,
among others.
II. Regulation 1007/2009
Seals are hunted within and outside the European
Union with a view to obtaining meat, oil, blubber,
organs, fir skins and other articles made from them. In
the words of the Regulation’’s preamble, the hunting
of seals has led to the expression of serious concerns by
members of the public due to the pain, distress, fear
and other forms of suffering which the killing and
skinning of seals, as most frequently performed, cause
to those animals.
In response to concerns about the animal welfare
aspects of the killing and skinning of seals, several
Member States had adopted or intended to adopt
legislation regulating trade in seal products by prohibit-
ing the import and production of such products, while
other Member States had placed no restrictions on
trade in these products. These differences in Member
States’ legislation were adversely affecting the operation
of the internal market, and this prompted the European
Union lawmaker to harmonise the rules across the EU
as regards commercial activities concerning seal pro-
ducts, and thereby prevent the disturbance of the
internal market in the products concerned. Although
animal welfare concerns were the primary cause of the
threatened disruption of the internal market, the Union
lawmaker considered itself to have sufficient regulatory
powers regarding the internal market to lay down rules
on the matter.4
The central provision in Regulation 1007/2009 is
contained in Article 3(1): ‘‘The placing on the market
of seal products shall be allowed only where the seal
products result from hunts traditionally conducted by
Inuit and other indigenous communities and contri-
bute to their subsistence. These conditions shall apply
at the time or point of import for imported products.’’
According to the Union lawmaker, the fundamental
economic and social interests of Inuit communities
engaged in the hunting of seals as a means to ensure
their subsistence should not be adversely affected. The
hunt was explicitly recognised as an integral part of
their culture and identity. Seal products resulting from
hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit and other
indigenous communities and contributing to their
subsistence should therefore be allowed.
In order to ensure the free movement of permitted
products, Article 4 of the Regulation provides:
‘‘Member States shall not impede the placing on the
market of seal products which comply with this
Regulation.’’
Despite the fact that the Regulation provides for a
special position for the Inuit, they nevertheless contest
it fiercely. The problem is that it is not clear in the
Regulation itself what the precise scope of the
exception is. What exactly should be understood by
‘‘hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit. . . and [con-
tributing] to their subsistence’’? Indeed, this is
recognised in the Regulation itself: Article 3(4) gives
the European Commission the power to adopt
measures for the implementation of, inter alia, the
prohibition in Article 3(1). In other words, it will be
the Commission that lays down further rules on the
conditions under which seal products that are the
result of hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit and
contribute to their subsistence may be placed on the
market. This prompted Duane Smith, the president of
Inuit Circumpolar Conference Canada, a Canadian
organisation representing and promoting the interests
of Inuit communities in the EU, to call on the EU ‘‘to
come clean on what they mean by the so-called Inuit
exemption, because, ‘‘until now the EU has demon-
strated more interest in keeping non-Inuit out of the
* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Groningen, The
Netherlands.
1 Case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v EP and
Council, Order of 6 September 2011.
2 Regulation 1007/2009 on trade in seal products, OJ EU
2009 L 286/36.
3 Cf. Art. 20(1) Declaration: ‘‘Indigenous peoples have the
right to maintain and develop their political, economic and
social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment
of their own means of subsistence and development, and to
engage freely in all their traditional and other economic
activities’’.
4 See on the powers of the EU regarding animal welfare:
J.H. Jans & H.H.B. Vedder, European Environmental Law,
After Lisbon, 4th edition 2012, pp. 11 and 32-33.
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market than finding ways of including Inuit. As such,
it is hard to support such an unclear, flawed, and
unfair regulation. They left us with no alternative but
to sue’’.5 Raymond Ningeocheak, Vice-President of
Finance for Nunavut Tunngavik Inc,6 added: ‘‘the
exemption in the Regulation is uncertain and was
adopted without the participation of Inuit, and the EU
is proceeding with implementing measures, also with-
out the participation of Inuit’’.7
Sufficient reason, therefore, to take legal action
against the Regulation. On 11 January 2010, a large
number of hunters and organisations promoting their
interests filed a lawsuit in the European General Court
seeking its annulment.
III. The Basis for the Action for
Annulment in the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU)
I have already on several occasions and in other
publications raised the issue of the problematic
position of third parties, particularly ‘‘general interest
organisations’’, seeking judicial protection.8 Put
briefly, the problem is the following. For an action
brought by a third party seeking the annulment of an
act of a European institution to be admissible the act
must be of ‘‘direct and individual concern’’ to the
applicant. Particularly the requirement that the act be
of ‘‘individual concern’’ proves in practice to be a
hurdle that is virtually insurmountable. According to
settled case law, persons are only considered to be
individually concerned ‘‘if that decision affects them
by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to
them or by reason of circumstances in which they are
differentiated from all other persons and, by virtue of
those factors, distinguishes them individually just as in
the case of the person addressed’’. In the literature this
is referred to as the Plaumann test.9
However, with the entry into force of the Lisbon
Treaty, the situation has changed somewhat. The real
culprit, the text of former Article 230(4) EU Treaty
and its interpretation by the Court of Justice, has been
amended by the Lisbon Treaty. The text (now Article
263(4) TFEU) currently states: ‘‘Any natural or legal
person may, under the conditions laid down in the first
and second paragraphs, institute proceedings against
an act addressed to that person or which is of direct
and individual concern to them, and against a
regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and
does not entail implementing measures.’’
The changes introduced by Lisbon are marked in
italics. Briefly, this means that the requirement of
‘‘individual concern’’ no longer applies, as long as the
action is against ‘‘a regulatory act which is of direct
concern to them and does not entail implementing
measures.’’ The problem, however, is that the term
‘‘regulatory act’’ is defined nowhere in the Treaties. It
is therefore not surprising that there has been
discussion in the literature on the interpretation of
the term. Incidentally, its interpretation is hardly
relevant in relation to directives as they, by definition,
require national implementing measures and can thus
never directly affect an individual. However, as
regards regulations, and in this case Regulation
1007/2009, the question may be raised whether the
term ‘‘regulatory acts’’ covers only ‘‘delegated’’ (Art.
290 TFEU) and ‘‘implementing’’ measures, or whether
it also includes regulations that that were made
according to a legislative procedure and are referred
to as ‘‘legislative acts’’ by the Treaty (Arts. 289 and
290 TFEU). Basically, these are procedural law acts;
since Lisbon, the terms ‘‘delegated acts’’ and ‘‘imple-
menting acts’’ (cf. Art. 290 TFEU) have been used to
refer to substantive secondary European law.
Some scholars, including Barents, do not regard
‘‘legislative acts’’ as ‘‘regulatory acts’’ within the
meaning of Art. 263(4) TFEU.10 Others are less purist
and argue, partly in view of the right of access to
justice granted by Article 47 of the European Charter
of Fundamental Rights,11 in favour of a broader
interpretation of the term so that it would, in principle,
cover all regulations.
In Case T-18/10, the General Court sided with the
purists. Applying a primarily systematic interpreta-
tion, it arrived at the conclusion that the term
‘‘regulatory act’’ does not cover all acts of general
application. In particular, the term ‘‘regulatory act’’
must be contrasted with the new term ‘‘legislative act’’.
The Court then concluded that the term ‘‘regulatory
act’’ must be understood as covering ‘‘all acts of
general application apart from legislative acts.’’ In
order to challenge these acts before the Court, it is
therefore no longer necessary for persons to show that
an act is of individual concern to them, provided it
does not entail implementing measures.
In this case the Court had little difficulty categoris-
ing Regulation 1007/2009 as a legislative act and not a
regulatory act. The Regulation was adopted using the




7 Cf. on this Art. 18 of the Declaration referred to in note 3:
‘‘Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in
decision-making in matters which would affect their rights,
through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance
with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and
develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions’’.
8 Cf. J.H. Jans & H.H.B. Vedder, European Environmental
Law, After Lisbon, 4th edition 2012, Chapter 5, section 5.1.
9 Case 25/62 Plaumann v Commission [1963] ECR 95.
10 Cf. R. Barents, Het Verdrag van Lissabon. Achtergronden
en commentaar, 2008, p. 508.
11 OJ EU 2010 C 83/2.
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co-decision procedure, since the Lisbon Treaty ‘‘the
ordinary legislative procedure’’ (Art. 294 TFEU).
According to the Court, categorisation of the regula-
tion depends on the procedure followed, not its
general nature. In this sense, the term ‘‘procedural
law’’, mentioned above, is certainly applicable.
Once the Regulation had been categorised as a
legislative rather than a regulatory act, this meant that
the admissibility of parties to the action had to be
judged in accordance with the older rules requiring
‘‘direct and individual concern’’. The central element
in the Regulation is that only seal products resulting
from hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit and other
indigenous communities and contributing to their
subsistence may be placed on the market (Art. 3 of
the Regulation). In this light, it is hardly surprising12
that the General Court only considered the Regulation
to be of direct concern to those persons that are active
on the European market. The Regulation may directly
affect the factual situation of other parties (the hunters
and organisations representing their interests), but not
their legal situation. Not, it should be added, that
direct concern would have helped these parties:
without blinking an eyelid, the Court applied the
settled case law regarding ‘‘individual concern’’ from
the Plaumann test, with the inevitable result that the
action was declared inadmissible.
IV.The Private Interest Bias in EU
Administrative Procedural Law
The question that may be raised is: What now? What
other options are available to the interested parties in
this case? As I have already indicated above, the
Commission will in due course take further measures
for the implementation of Article 3(1) regarding what
exactly must be understood by ‘‘other indigenous
communities’’ and ‘‘hunts traditionally conducted’’. It
seems to me that such measures could certainly be
regarded as regulatory acts. It would then no longer be
possible to dismiss an action against those further
measures by exporters of sealskins and other traders
active on the European market for want of ‘‘individual
concern’’. And, it seems to me, as the requirement of
‘‘direct concern’’ would also be met in this case,
nothing else ought to stand in the way of an admissible
action. Unless the second condition of Article 263(4)
was not fulfilled, namely that the regulatory act ‘‘does
not entail implementing measures’’. Here, this was not
an issue the General Court had to rule on, as the
Regulation could not be regarded as a regulatory act.13
It is important to note that most regulations are
implemented in Member States when the competent
national authorities apply the harmonised European
rules in a specific case. The same will apply here: the
competent national customs authorities will have to
refuse the import of products that do not fulfil the
conditions laid down by the Regulation. If the refusal
were then regarded as an implementing measure, the
practical impact of the widening of the right to appeal
would in fact be very limited. If that were the
interpretation given, an interested party would still
have to appeal the individual decision before the
national courts arguing that the European regulation
was invalid (see Art. 277 TFEU), and the national
court would then first have to request the Court of
Justice for a preliminary ruling on validity. However,
for the present purpose I shall assume that an
individual decision of a national authority in imple-
mentation of the European rule could not be regarded
as an implementing measure within the meaning of
Article 263 TFEU, and that an action brought by
persons trading seal products on the European market
would be admissible in an action against the further
measures taken by the Commission to implement
Article 3 of the Regulation.
Little will change for the hunters and the organisa-
tions protecting their interests. It may be assumed that
the Court will conclude that although those further
implementing measures do affect the factual position
of the hunters, they cannot be said to affect their legal
position. In all probability the action will again be
ruled inadmissible. Elsewhere, I have argued that
European administrative procedural law is ‘‘private
interest biased’’.14 It is not sufficient to guarantee
judicial protection in policy areas where general
interests are at stake, as for example is the case
concerning the protection of the cultural identity of
minority groups. Active market participants will get
their day in court, but the hunter whose traditional
way of life is threatened faces a closed door.
Are the hunters out of options, then? With a little
goodwill, Regulation 1007/2009 could be regarded as
environmental law within the meaning of Regulation
1367/2006 on the application of the provisions of the
Aarhus Convention.15 This Regulation defines ‘‘envir-
onmental law’’ as ‘‘Community legislation which,
irrespective of its legal basis, contributes to the pursuit
of the objectives of Community policy on the
environment as set out in the Treaty: preserving,
12 See also Case C-362/06 P Sahlstedt v Commission [2009]
ECR I-2903.
13 Meanwhile, the General Court has given some considera-
tion to this issue, Case T-262/10 Microban v Commission,
Judgment of 25 October 2011 and more recently Case T-
381/11 Eurofer v Commission, Judgment of 4 June 2012.
14 J.H. Jans & H.H.B. Vedder, European Environmental
Law, After Lisbon, 4th edition 2012, p. 241.
15 Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the
application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to
Community institutions and bodies, OJ EU 2006 L 264/13.
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protecting and improving the quality of the environ-
ment, protecting human health, the prudent and
rational utilisation of natural resources, and promot-
ing measures at international level to deal with
regional or worldwide environmental problems’’. This
would seem a viable argument, given the references to
‘‘the sustainable management of marine resources’’ in
both the preamble and text of Regulation 1007/2009.
Article 10 of Regulation 1367/2006 creates an ‘‘inter-
nal review procedure’’: ‘‘Any non-governmental orga-
nisation which meets the criteria set out in Article 11 is
entitled to make a request for internal review to the
Community institution or body that has adopted an
administrative act under environmental law or, in case
of an alleged administrative omission, should have
adopted such an act’’. The reason this internal review
procedure was created was the lamentable position of
environmental organisations under Article 263(4)
TFEU. However, access to the review procedure is
confined to ‘‘administrative acts’’, in the Regulation
defined as ‘‘any measure of individual scope under
environmental law, taken by a Community institution
or body, and having legally binding and external
effects’’. Research into the initial application of the
review procedure has shown that European institu-
tions interpret the term ‘‘administrative act’’, and
particularly the element ‘‘individual scope’’, extremely
restrictively.16 Consequently, hardly any applications
have successfully overcome the admissibility hurdle. In
the light of this research, it has been argued that access
to the review procedure should be widened, particu-
larly in view of the new Article 263(4) TFEU, in such a
way that acts of general application, not being
legislative acts, should also fall within the scope of
application of the Regulation. The basis for this
argument, we felt, was to be found in the Aarhus
Convention. Article 1 of Regulation 1367/2006 states
its object to be ‘‘to contribute to the implementation of
the obligations arising under [. . . the Aarhus Conven-
tion]’’. From Article 2(2) of the Convention, it is clear
that the Convention does not apply to public
authorities acting in a legislative capacity. The
explanation for this exception can be found in the
Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide, which
states: ‘‘This is due to the fundamentally different
character of decision-making [. . .] in a legislative
capacity, where elected representatives are more
directly accountable to the public through the election
process [. . .]’’.17 From this we deduce that not every act
of general application is excluded from the scope of
the Aarhus Convention, but only where it is legislation
in the true sense of the word. For this reason, the
authors argue in favour of interpreting the term
‘‘individual scope’’ in Regulation 1367/2006 so as to
be consistent with the Convention,18 and thus confined
to true ‘‘legislative acts’’. This would create the
possibility of making further implementing measures
by the Commission under Article 3 of Regulation
1007/2009 subject to internal review under Regulation
1367/2006. In my view, the decision of the General
Court in Case T-18/10 offers interesting perspectives,
particularly as a result of the distinction made between
‘‘legislative acts’’ and ‘‘regulatory acts’’. In a most
recent case the General Court seems to have followed
a similar line of thought.19 It ruled that Article 10(1) of
Regulation 1367/2006 – which limits access to the
internal review procedure to ‘‘measure[s] of individual
scope’’ – is incompatible with the Aarhus Convention.
The problem remains that the review procedure is
available only to non-governmental organisations
whose primary stated objective is to promote environ-
mental protection (Art. 11 Regulation 1367/2006).
Individual Inuit hunters and organisations aiming to
protect the interests of Inuit in general would still be
excluded, even under this procedure. Nevertheless, the
decision does offer interesting perspectives for ‘‘gen-
uine’’ environmental organisations.
16 J.H. Jans & G.J. Harryvan, ‘‘Internal Review of EU
Environmental Measures. It’s True: Baron Van Munchau-
sen Doesn’t Exist! Some Remarks on the Application of the
So-Called Aarhus Regulation’’, [2010] Review of European
and Administrative Law, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 53-65.
17 To be found at: http://www.unece.org/env/pp/acig.pdf.
This document does not, though, have any particular legal
status.
18 See for the obligation under Union law to interpret in a
way which is consistent with the Aarhus Convention Case
C-240/09 Lesoochrana´rske zoskupenie, Judgment of 8 March
2011.
19 General Court Case T-338/08 Stichting Natuur en Milieu
and Pesticide Action Network Europe v Commission, Judg-
ment of 14 June 2012. See also, on the same day, Case T-
396/09 Vereniging voor Milieudefensie v Commission.
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